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Article
Intellectual Property Law and Indigenous
Peoples: Adapting Copyright Law to the
Needs of a Global Community
Megan M. Carpentert
The definition and scope of intellectual property and associated
laws are under intense debate in the emerging discourse
surrounding intellectual property and human rights. These
debates primarily arise within the context of indigenous peoples'
rights to protection and ownership of culturally specific
properties. It is true that intellectual property laws are based on
Western, developed markets, Western concepts of creation and
invention, and Western concepts of ownership. But whatever
their origins, those laws have been, and currently are, the
primary vehicle for the protection of artistic, literary, and
scientific works worldwide. To segregate indigenous interests
from this international legal regime, particularly in light of the
increasing globalization of markets, is to deny indigenous
peoples both a powerful legal shield and a powerful legal sword.
This Article argues that copyright laws can, and must, be
expanded so as to maintain the vitality of, and protect, the
creative artistic and literary works of indigenous cultures. The
Article proposes three major changes to international copyright
law: the incorporation of collective and communal notions of
authorship, the expansion of the originality requirement to
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reflect these forms of authorship, and the application of limits on
the duration of copyright protection in a broader community
context. The Article further proposes that a variety of
intellectual property mechanisms be drawn upon to provide
special protection for "sacred" cultural works.
I. INTRODUCTION
[Aluthorship may reside in pre-human creator ancestors, such as
the Wandjina of the Kimberley region. Authorship is replaced by
a concept of interpretation through initiation. Ownership yields
to a concept of custodianship of dreamings, or legends.
Alienation, is contradicted by the concept of immutable
communal property. Exploitation, is subject to cultural
restraints and taboos. Incentivization also has to yield to
concerns about spiritual adulteration.'
Intellectual property and human rights make strange bedfellows. Or, at
least, so one would have thought until recently. Within a context of
globalization and the increasing commodification of content, intellectual
property and human rights are interacting in a variety of fora in
unexpected ways. The definition and scope of intellectual property and
associated laws are under intense debate in the emerging discourse
surrounding intellectual property and human rights. These debates
primarily arise within the context of indigenous peoples' 2 rights to
protection and ownership of culturally specific "properties," 3 including
arts, sacred works and knowledge, biocultural knowledge, ethnobiological
knowledge, and cultural expressions. Participants in the ongoing
theoretical debates decidedly differ over whether intellectual property
rights are the appropriate mechanism by which such cultural works or
embodiments should be protected. Some authors argue for a new legal
regime specifically designed for indigenous peoples to protect and benefit
from the expressions, knowledge, and works of their culture.4 Others argue
1 Michael Blakeney, Intellectual Property in the Dreamtime - Protecting the Cultural Creativity
of Indigenous Peoples, Oxford Intell. Prop. Res. Center, Research Seminar, Pt 1 (Nov. 9, 1999),
http://www.oipirc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP199.html.
2 Not surprisingly, the definition of indigenous peoples is itself a subject of debate. For
the purposes of this article, I adopt the generally accepted definition of Dr. Martinez Cobo,
which describes indigenous peoples as "those which, having historical continuity with pre-
invasion and precolonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves
distinct from other sectors of the society now prevailing in those territories or parts of them."
Id. at Pt 1(c) (quoting Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7).
3 See generally Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
4 See Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property
the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (Fall 1997) see also Craig D. Jacoby & Charles Weiss,
Recognizing Property Rights in Traditional Biocultural Contribution, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 74
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that property laws themselves should be sufficient.5 Still others argue that
natural resource laws can serve as a vehicle for the protection of cultural
properties from exploitation by third parties. 6 Problems commonly
outlined by these authors are significant, and dislodge some of the rooted
legal operatives of intellectual property laws. 7
However, if one deals with intellectual property exclusively as a
subject matter, rather than a bundle of specific legal operatives established
in international and domestic legal systems, the inclusion of indigenous
peoples' cultural and scientific knowledge, expressions and artistic and
literary works fits squarely within that realm. It is true that intellectual
property laws are based on Western, developed markets, Western concepts
of creation and invention, and Western concepts of ownership (as
evidenced even by the use of the term "intellectual properties").8 But
whatever their origins, the fact remains that those laws have been, and
currently are, the primary vehicle for the protection of artistic, literary, and
scientific works worldwide. To segregate indigenous interests from this
international legal regime, particularly in light of increasing globalization
of markets and commodification of content, is to deny indigenous peoples
both a powerful legal shield and a powerful legal sword. It is essential that,
when found inadequate or inapposite, intellectual property laws are not
discarded, but rather adapted to accommodate indigenous situations.
The intellectual property legal regime is a powerful one, its component
parts comprising a complex body of law, an existing mind share, and a
cache-all of which have developed over the years, and from which all
peoples should benefit. Thus, if the workings of the intellectual property
machine involve culturally-specific components, that machine should not
be discarded when it is found ineffectual for all cultures; rather, the
machine should be reconstructed such that it works for all cultures. The
inclusion of indigenous peoples' cultural knowledge, inventions,
expressions, and works within an intellectual property regime requires
some rewiring of the parts, but does not diminish the potential legal value
of the machine itself. This Article discusses the means by which indigenous
interests can, and should, be incorporated into intellectual property law. 9
(1997).
5 See Michael J. Huft, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A Question of
Intellectual Property Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1678, 1679 (citing Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights,
Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological Change, 35 J. L. & ECON. 199 (1992)) (discussing property
theory as one of several approaches toward protection of indigenous medicines).
6 See id.
7 Also striking is the degree of success that other types of groups-with far less
quantifiable history, cultural development, or identification with the group on multiple levels
(including language, art, religion, and customary law), but with far more financial capital -
have had at asserting intellectual property rights within the current legal system in the United
States. See, e.g., Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907
F.Supp. 1361, 1375 (N. D. Cal. 1995); Church of Scientology Int'l v. Fishman, 35 F.3d 570 (9th
Cir. 1994); Church of Scientology Int'l v. Elmira Mission of Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38,
43 (2d Cir. 1986).
8 See Aoki, supra note 3.
9 In this article I have chosen not to explore patent-related indigenous issues. While such
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Copyright laws, in their current formulation, are inadequate to protect the
fruits of human creativity of indigenous peoples. Thus, I will argue that
copyright laws can, and must, be expanded in three ways so as to protect
and maintain the vitality of the artistic and literary works of indigenous
cultures: incorporating collective and communal authorship; expanding
originality requirements to reflect collective and communal authorship;
and applying limits on the duration of protection in a broader community
context. I also propose that a variety of intellectual property mechanisms
be drawn upon to provide special protection for "sacred" cultural works.In
Part One, I use the debates over terminology to illuminate briefly some of
the cultural issues at play with respect to the protection of the literary,
artistic, and scientific works of indigenous peoples. In Part Two, I discuss
the parameters of "intellectual property" and introduce the concept and
operation of copyrights. In Part Three, I argue that the legal construction of
authorship within the copyright context must be expanded to
accommodate indigenous interests. In this Section, I examine in detail
notions of authorship as they are embedded in intellectual property law
and show that they run contrary to fundamental principles of authorship
held by indigenous peoples. I argue that authorship must be reconstructed
to accommodate cultural difference. I discuss developments toward that
end in Australian case law and suggest additional intellectual property
concepts that can be drawn upon to further that objective. In Part Four, I
address the need to recast originality requirements to reflect an expanded
notion of authorship, and in Part Five, I explore the various alternatives to
basing the duration of rights on the "life of the author" within this
expanded framework, noting both practical and policy conflicts over the
duration of rights. Finally, in Part Six, I advocate special protection for
sacred cultural works, and explore some of the already established legal
mechanisms, in addition to copyright, through which this protection can be
sought.
II. TERMINOLOGY AND CULTURAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY, ARTISTIC, AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Indigenous peoples have a variety of reasons for seeking protection of
their traditional knowledge, including the conservation of traditional
knowledge, protection against commercial exploitation, attribution, and
benefit-sharing.10 Their motives may arise from concern over
issues are timely, they are also complex, and an adequate explication of those issues is beyond
the scope of this article.
For further information, see Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights &
Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge
and the Conversation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 59 (Fall 1998); Erica-Irene Daes,
Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, Address Before the Ninety-Fifth Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (April 4-7, 2001), in 95 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PRoc. 143 (2001); Huft, supra note 5); and Laurie Anne Whitt, Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual
Property, and the New Imperial Science, 23 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 211 (1998).
10 Of course, there are larger issues implicated as well, issues which are outside the scope
[Vol. 7
2004] Adapting Copyright Law to the Needs of a Global Community 55
misappropriation, the preservation of biodiversity, promotion of the use of
traditional knowledge for development, or external pressures exerted upon
the groups." The protection of this knowledge may be sought from within
and without intellectual property legal regimes; that is, indigenous peoples
may look to existing intellectual property structures for protection, and
may also advocate the development of sui generis forms of protection for
their traditional knowledge. Differing objectives have led, in turn, to
distinct methods of casting the terms of the debate.
There has been an active debate regarding the proper terminology for
the cultural properties and expressions of indigenous peoples since the mid
1980s, when the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), and
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
("UNESCO") brought together a Group of Experts on the Protection of
Expressions of Folklore by Intellectual Property. 12 Until this time, the
products of the intellectual labor of indigenous peoples fell under the
rubric of "folklore." 13 At this meeting, some representatives asserted that
the term "folklore" had the negative connotation of being associated with
lower or superseded civilizations.14 WIPO and UNESCO responded by
providing a definition of the term, 5 which persisted until the World Forum
on the Protection of Folklore in 1997.16 The debate over terminology that
occurred at this Forum illuminates some of the cultural issues surrounding
copyright protection, including communal authorship and the need to
recognize the ongoing vitality of indigenous works.
At the Forum, many delegates raised issues related to the inadequacy
of the term "folklore." Some representatives continued to assert that the
term was commonly understood to cover static, antiquated traditions
meant to be collected and preserved, rather than dynamic, living
traditions.17 An African delegate noted that the term had distinct
interpretations in different regions. For instance, the African conception of
"folklore" was broad, encompassing all aspects of cultural heritage,
of this article but which merit mention, such as the specific political, social, and economic
positions of particular indigenous groups and their access to land they have traditionally
inhabited.
11 COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 (London 2002).
12 Blakeney, supra note 1.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 The definition provided of folklore is a group-oriented and tradition-based creation of
groups or individuals reflecting the expectations of the community as an adequate expression
of its cultural and social identity; its standards are transmitted orally, by imitation or by other
means. Its forms include, among others, language, literature, music, dance, games,
mythology, rituals, customs, handicrafts, architecture, and other arts. Model Provisions for
National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and
Other Prejudicial Actions (1985), http://users.ox.ac.uk/-wgtrr/modprovs.htm.
16 This Forum was held in February 1996 following the recommendations of the WIPO
Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, and the Committee of
Experts on a Possible Instrument for the Protection of the Rights of Performers and the
Producers of Phonograms.
17 Blakeney, supra note 1, at 2.
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including scientific knowledge,18 while the western conception of
"folklore" typically focused on artistic, literary, and performing works.
Aboriginal Australian representatives at the Forum supported the notion
that "folklore" was too narrowly defined and implied an inferiority of the
indigenous culture. They proposed the term "Indigenous Cultural and
Intellectual Property," initially suggested by Ms. Erica Daes, Special
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities.19
In the years since, the term Traditional Knowledge has replaced
Folklore, shifting somewhat the parameters of discourse. Traditional
Knowledge encompasses the broad range of indigenous peoples' cultural
heritage, including not only artistic, literary, performing, and associated
works, but also the traditional knowledge derived from plants and animals
in medical treatment and foodstuffs.20 Traditional Knowledge, therefore,
falls under patent law and biodiversity rights, as well as copyright law.
Commentators have claimed that the use of the term Traditional
Knowledge signifies a move toward separating indigenous works from
other subjects of intellectual property, and, by extension, toward sui generis
solutions to the protection of the cultural properties and expressions of
indigenous peoples.21 Whether intellectual property law, sui generis
solutions, or some combination of the two is applied to protect indigenous
heritage, developing a vocabulary that is both culturally broad and
compatible with the dynamic, evolving culture of indigenous peoples has
been recognized as an essential step. As Traditional Knowledge appears to
accommodate both concerns, it will be the terminology used in this Article
to refer to the general products of indigenous heritage. When explicating
the specific products affected by copyright laws, however, for the sake of
clarity, I will instead use precise legal terms of art.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS THE FRUIT OF
HUMAN CREATIVITY AND INVENTION
Intellectual property is a "creation of the mind."22 It shares many
characteristics of real and personal property, in that it is generally
considered to be an asset, and as such can be bought, sold, licensed,
exchanged, or given away. Furthermore, the intellectual property rights-
holder has the ability to prevent its unauthorized use or sale. The most
salient difference between intellectual property and other forms of
property, however, is that intellectual property is intangible in nature; that
18 See, e.g., Ghana, Copyright Law of 1985, par. 2 (enacted Mar. 21, 1985),
http://www.unesco.org/culture/copy/copyright/ghana/pagel.html#5.
19 Blakeney, supra note 1, at 2.
20 As Daes notes, subdividing the heritage of the indigenous people implies "giving
different levels of protection to different elements of heritage." T. Simpson, INDIGENOUS
HERITAGE AND SELF-DETERMINATION, IWGIA Document 86,55 (1997).
21 Blakeney, supra note 1, at 2-3.
22 WIPO, ABOUT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
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is, it cannot generally be identified by its own physicality. According to
WIPO, intellectual property is divided into two categories: industrial
property, which includes inventions (patents), trademarks, industrial
designs, and geographic indications of source; and copyright, which
includes literary and artistic works such as novels, poems, plays, films,
musical works, software, drawings, paintings, photographs, sculptures,
and architectural designs.23 "Rights related to copyright include those of
performing artists in their performances, producers of phonograms in their
recordings, and those of broadcasters in their radio and television
programs." 24 Intellectual property may include a certain shade of color
(such as the use of brown as a trademark for the United Parcel Service),25 a
place of origin (such as geographical indications for Champagne26 or
Gorgonzola),27 or a shape (such as design patent protection for the Coca-
Cola bottle).28 There are intellectual property implications for plant
varieties,29 sacred religious and cultural knowledge,30 and genetic
resources.31 Intellectual property is found on coffee tables, walls, and in
cupboards; in cars, pharmacies, and the outdoors; on t-shirts, signs, and
inside refrigerators.3 2 Simply put, intellectual property is the fruit of
human creativity and invention.
A. Copyrights Are Intended to Encourage and Protect Artistic Works
Copyright is a form of legal protection provided to the authors of
"original works of authorship."33 Copyrights protect literary and artistic
works, both published and unpublished, provided they are fixed in a
tangible or material form. Copyright protection begins when the work is
created; that is, no registration is necessary to establish copyrights in a
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 U.S. Trademark Ser. No. 76408109 (filed June 20, 2002),
at http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser=serial&entry= 7 640 8 10 9 .
26 "Champagne" is protected as a geographical indication in Europe because it refers to a
specific wine-producing region of France. In other markets, such as the United States, the term
is viewed as being descriptive. See Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, What
Does TRIPS Say About the Protection [sic] Geographical Indications?,
at http://www.dfat.gov.au/ip/geo -indtrips.htnl (last modified Sept. 17, 2002).
27 For an interesting discussion of geographical source indications in the world of
cheeses, see Geographical Indications, PTC Forum: Online Journal of the Patent, Trademark &
Copyright Research Foundation, at http://www.ptcforum.org/EDITORIAL%2010006.htm
Gan. 30, 2002).
28 U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1057884 (registered Feb. 1, 1977),
at http://tarr.uspto.gov/servlet/tarr?regser=serial&entry= 7 3 0 8 8 3 84 .
29 See generally, Whitt, supra note 9; Jacoby & Weiss, supra note 4.
30 See generally, Lucy M. Moran, Intellectual Property Law Protection for Traditional and
Sacred "Folklife Expressions"- Will Remedies Become Available to Cultural Authors and
Communities?, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 99 (1998); Farley, supra note 4.
31 See generally Whitt, supra note 9; Jacoby & Weiss, supra note 4.
32 WIPO, AT HOME WITH INvENTION, at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/athome.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
33 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
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work, and copyright laws grant the creator the exclusive right to
reproduce, distribute, perform and display the work publicly, as well as to
prepare derivative works.
34
Under copyright law, the creator of the original expression in a work is
its actual author. The author is also the owner of copyright unless there is a
written agreement by which the author assigns the copyright to another
person or entity. In the case of a work made for hire, authorship is
attributed to the employer or the contracting party. Authorship is an
integral operative of copyright laws.
Authorship is particularly relevant in an additional way: copyrights
last for a limited duration, using as their basis the life of the author. These
limits on the duration of protection are mandated by the Berne
Convention,35 as well as some national laws, such as Article 1 of the United
States Constitution.36 Other national laws that provide protection for
literary and artistic works of indigenous peoples imply perpetual
protection for these works, and still others, such as those of Sri Lanka,
Ghana, and the Congo explicitly provide it.
37
IV. LEGAL CONSTRUCTS OF AUTHORSHIP MUST
ACCOMMODATE CULTURAL DIFFERENCE
Authorship in the context of copyright laws has its grounding in
Romantic Individualism, which can run directly contrary to authorship as
it is conceived of by indigenous peoples. It is absolutely essential that
intellectual property laws recognize these differences in cultural values and
societal norms and evolve to accommodate these distinctions.
A. The Construct of Authorship Under Traditional Intellectual
Property Law Is Steeped in the Cultural Notion of Romantic
Individualism
In order to gain a full understanding of authorship under copyright
laws it is worthwhile to trace its history and development. The genesis of
modern copyright law is often considered to be the 1709 Statute of Anne,
which had as its stated goal to encourage "learned Men to compose and
write useful Books." 38 This statute, in practice, served more as a benefit to
publishers than writers, in so far as it codified trade regulation practices of
the London guild of printers and booksellers that controlled the book trade
34 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
35 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971 (date
of most recent revision).
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
37 See Moran, supra note 30, at 103.
38 Statute of Anne, 1709, c. 19 (Eng.).
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in the United Kingdom. 39 Underlying the enactment of this statute was the
increasingly widespread mechanical reproduction of text and a perceived
need for accountability for written works.40
Over the course of the eighteenth century, however, with the rise of the
Romantic author, the law shifted from a publishers' copyright to an
authors' copyright. Under the ethos of Romanticism, literature began to be
seen as the product of an individual's private thoughts rather than the
transference of ideas that were already in the public domain.41 Before the
Romantic period, notions of authorship were less focused on the
individual. In classical Greece, for example, authors had been
conceptualized as mere vessels receiving gifts of art and literature from the
nine muses. Thus, Plato and Aristotle viewed themselves not as creators of
text, but as artisans. Even in Shakespeare's time, dialogue and plot lines
were borrowed freely without attribution to their original source.42 It
wasn't until the literary accounts of Romantic authorship by Young, Kant,
Fichte, Wordsworth, Keats and their contemporaries that authorship was
attributed to an original creator whose work "rose spontaneously from his
living being."43 Keats wrote, "I never wrote one single Line of Poetry with
the least Shadow of Public thought."44 As authors began to be regarded as
creators rather than producers, inspiration was seen as emanating from
within the writer, and the "work was made peculiarly and distinctively the
product - and the property - of the writer."45
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, copyright law existed to
protect publishers' rights, not authors' rights. However, with
industrialization came mass production and a commodification of
culture.46 In the context of the Enlightenment, a new group of individuals
emerged, individuals who wanted to earn their livelihood from the sale of
their writings. 47 An increasingly literate public began to respect writing as
a profession, and saw the writer as an originator of works; a writer was no
longer part of the assembly line of publication, but rather a creator of text.48
This Romantic idea of seeing the writer as an originator of text informs the
current legal discussions of copyright. In the Trade-Mark Cases, the U.S.
39 See Mark Rose, The Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741), in THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 211, 213 (Martha
Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
40 See Rowland Lorimer, Intellectual Property, Moral Rights, and Trading Regimes, 21 CAN. J.
COMM. 267, 272 (1996).
41 See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of
the Emergence of the "Author," 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 434 (1984).
42 Lorimer, supra note 40, at 271.
43 Lorimer, supra note 40, at 272.
44 Letter by John Keats, in LETrERS OF JOHN KEATS: To His FAMILY AND FRIENDS at 96
(Sidney Colvin ed.) (1935).
45 Woodmansee, supra note 41, at 427.
46 See Jacqueline Rhodes, Copyright, Authorship, and the Professional Writer: The Case of
William Wordsworth, CARDIFF CORVEY: READING THE ROMANTIc TEXT, Issue 8 (June 2002),
http://www.cf.ac.uk/encap/corvey/articles/ccO8-nOl.html.
47 See Woodmansee, supra note 41, at 426.
48 See Rhodes, supra note 46, at 3-4.
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Supreme Court ruled that compilations of data, for example, could not be
copyrighted unless they showed "some minimal degree of creativity," as
copyrightable works "are original, and are founded in the creative powers
of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of
intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and
the like." 49 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the United States Supreme
Court held that parody can constitute fair use provided the original
material is "transformed." Thus, an author's creativity serves as an
affirmative defense against a charge of copyright infringement: "[T]he
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use."
50
B. Conceptions of Authorship in Indigenous Communities Differ
Widely from Those Typically Embodied in Intellectual Property
Laws
In Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Ltd.,51 the High Court of Australia awarded
damages to plaintiffs whose copyrights in sacred works were infringed by
an outside organization that reproduced those designs onto carpets. This
case will be discussed in greater detail in the next Section. In the meantime,
the story of one artist involved in that suit provides an illustrative
introduction to indigenous conceptions of authorship.
Banduk Marika is a member of the Yolngu Clan who was given the
right to use the imagery of her creators by the traditional owners of the
clan. Under Aboriginal law, underlying cultural images belong to the clan
communally, while the right to create artworks and use pre-existing
designs of the clan resides with the traditional owners, who are considered
to be custodians of the images.5 2 These traditional owners may determine
whether cultural images may be used in artwork, who may create such
work, and the terms of its reproduction.53 Malawan, the senior
representative of the Rirratjingu clan, gave Ms. Marika permission to
depict part of the mythology of the Djang'Kawu creation story, which is of
great importance to her clan.54 In her work, she depicted the story of
Djanda55 and the Sacred Waterhole, a creation story in which the creator
Djang'Kawu and his two sisters, the Wagilag sisters, traveled from
49 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
50 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 570 (1994).
51 Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Ltd. (1994) 130 A.L.R. 659 (Austl.) [hereinafter M. & Others, in
accordance with traditional Aboriginal custom against speaking the names of the dead].
52 Id. at 663; World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Case Study 1, 9 at
www.wipo.org/tk/en/studies/cultural/minding-culture/studies/carpetscase.pdf.
53 M. & Others, supra note 51, at 663; WIPO, Case Study 1, supra note 52.
54 M. & Others, supra note 51, at 663. Banduk Marika is the daughter of Mawalan, who
was the leader of the Rirratjingu clan until his death in 1967. WIPO, Case Study 1, supra note
52, at 4.
55 Djanda is part of a larger story, which cannot be generally disclosed. WIPO, Case Study
1, supra note 52, at 6.
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Burralku to Yelangbara.56 This work was included in an educational
portfolio produced by the Australian National Gallery ('ANG') in 1988,
which was meant to serve as an educational resource of the best Aboriginal
artworks in the ANG.57 In 1992, she discovered that a Vietnamese carpet
company had appropriated the portfolio and reproduced several
Aboriginal works from it, including hers, onto woolen carpets.5 8
Since such reproduction was in opposition to the cultural use of the
imagery, the consequences for Ms. Marika were potentially grievous.
Under Aboriginal law, if permission has been given by the traditional
owners to a particular artist to create a work, and that work is later
inappropriately reproduced by others, the artist is held responsible for the
breach, even where the artist had no knowledge of, or control over, the
infringement.59 She explained, "As an artist, whilst I may own copyright
under western law, under Aboriginal law I must not use an image or story
in such a way as to undermine the rights of all the other Yolngu."60 She
explained that, in fact, she could have been subject to a variety of sanctions
if her family had found out, from expulsion from the clan to being
prevented from creating more art.61 The possibility of spearing was noted
as a possible sanction by the court in serious cases of infringement.
62
Another authorship problem is illuminated by the case of the
Wandjina, the Creation Ancestors of the Kimberley Aborigines. Their
56 M. & Others,, supra note 51, at 662:
[Creation stories and dreaming stories] are represented in ceremonies of
deep significance, and are often secret or sacred, known only to a few
senior members of the clan chosen according to age, descendence, sex,
initiation, experience in the learning of the dreamings and ceremonies,
and the attainment of skills which permit the faithful reproduction of the
stories in accordance with Aboriginal law and custom. Painting
techniques, and the use of totemic and other images and symbols are...
strictly controlled by Aboriginal law and custom. Artworks are an
important means of recording these stories, and for teaching future
generations. Accuracy in the portrayal of the story is of great importance.
Inaccuracy, or error in the faithful reproduction of an artwork, can cause
deep offence to those familiar with the dreaming.
57 M. & Others, supra note 51, at 661; WIPO, supra note 52, at 4.
58 M. & Others, supra note 51, at 660; see also WIPO, supra note 52, at 2-4.
59 M. & Others, supra note 51, at 663.
60 Id.
61 M. & Others, supra note 51, at 663-64; WIPO Case Study 1, supra note 52 (citing Banduk
Marika, Affidavit, 1994):
Even though I know that I am not responsible for the reproduction I am
still concerned about the ramifications for me and my work within
Yolngu society, and I greatly fear a loss of reputation arising from Yolngu
associating me with the reproduction. I fear that my family and others
may accuse me of giving permission for the reproduction behind their
backs without consulting and seeking permission in the manner required
by our law and culture. I fear that this could result in my family and
others deciding that I cannot be trusted to use important images such as
this one anymore. This would not only threaten my artistic and economic
livelihood, but also my ability to participate fully in Yolngu society and
cultural practice.
62 M & Others, supra note 51, at 663.
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paintings are found in rock galleries in the Kimberley region. It is
impossible to determine authorship of these paintings for copyright
purposes, since the paintings are ancient, though believed to be done by
the Wandjina. According to the Kimberley Aborigines, the images may be
retouched or painted today, provided that deference is given to the
Creators. 63 If the paintings are not treated appropriately, the Kimberley
Aborigines believe that those actions will bring death and devastation.
64
There is, however, no law that would prevent these images from being
appropriated and exploited by commercial enterprises. Notably, a design
of the Wandjina spirit is now used as a logo for a surfboard company.65 The
exploitation of the Wandjina spirit image is a harm without a remedy.
Although these images have great cultural significance to indigenous
peoples, the exploitation of the images is not actionable without an
identifiable individual author.
The Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
has concluded: [I]ndigenous peoples do not view their
heritage as property at all -that is something which has an
owner and is used for the purpose of extracting economic
benefits-but in terms of community and individual
responsibility. Possessing a song, story or other medicinal
knowledge carries with it certain responsibilities to show
respect to and maintain a reciprocal relationship with the
human beings, animals, plants and places which the song,
story or medicine is connected. For indigenous peoples,
heritage is a bundle of relationships rather than a bundle
of economic rights.
66
It is critical that intellectual property laws recognize these differences in
cultural values and societal norms, and evolve to accommodate these
distinctions. One way this transformation can occur is to recognize
communal responsibility over a work through expanded constructions of
authorship.
In various legal fora worldwide, courts are beginning to grapple with
these issues and incorporate cultural distinctions into legal realities. In the
largest body of case law on the subject, Australian courts have begun to
address issues of authorship for copyright purposes as Australian
Aboriginal peoples seek protection of culturally significant works from
exploitation.
63 Blakeney, supra note 1, at pt. 2, § d.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 E.I. Daes, Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Study on the Protection of the Cultural
and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., Agenda
Item 14, para. 26 (1993).
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C. Reconceptualizing Authorship to Accommodate Cultural
Difference Is Essential, and Movements Toward that End Are Best
Illuminated by Developing Australian Case Law
In Australia, there exists a well-developed legal regime for the
protection of intellectual property interests, as well as a vital, influential
indigenous Aboriginal culture. This combination has led to a
groundbreaking body of case law located at the intersection of indigenous
interests and intellectual property. This remainder of this Article, therefore,
will focus primarily on the developments in this jurisdiction. While
Australian courts have not yet explicitly expanded legal notions of the
author for copyright purposes, the growing body of case law seeking the
protection of sacred Aboriginal works from exploitation- and the
increasing, if spotty, success of those efforts -illuminate the importance of
this issue. Furthermore, a growing pattern of creative lawmaking and dicta
shows that judges are beginning to recognize the need for such
reconfiguration.
1. Early Infringement Actions Represent an Attempt by Courts to
Apply Intellectual Property Law to the Protection of Aboriginal
Artworks
The first case dealing with the unauthorized reproduction of
Aboriginal designs was Foster v. Mountford,67 in which the Supreme Court
of the Northern Territory estopped the publication of an anthropology text
called Nomads of the Desert.68 This text purported to document the life of the
Pitjantjatjara People and contained not only matters of deep religious and
cultural significance, but also images that were sacred to the Pitjantjatjara
People and were forbidden even to uninitiated members of the
Pitjantjatara.69 Since the designs that were reproduced were tribal secrets
and were not to be seen by uninitiated tribe members, the court was able to
issue an injunction to suppress publication of the text.70
Where the facts do not fit as easily within existing intellectual property
law, for example, where the Aboriginal designs would be considered to be
in the public domain, the issue becomes more complex. 71 The Australian
67 Foster v. Mountford (1978) (N.T. Supreme Court), 29 F.L.R. 233.
68 For an account of the case, see Blakeney, supra note 1, at 8.
69 See Blakeney, supra note 1, at 8.
70 See id.
71 As Blakeney notes:
Aboriginal Peoples have no right equivalent to those which are conferred
under the action of blasphemy. The NIAA (National Indigenous Arts
Advocacy Association, Inc.) Report refers to a story used in the television
series "Heartlands" which belonged to a Western Australian Aboriginal
community, but which was represented as coming from New South
Wales. Because the story was in the public domain, the relevant
community had no rights to prevent the transmission of this programme.
The law does not currently recognize the proprietary interests of
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Copyright Act of 1968 establishes a cause of action for artists whose works
have been reproduced without authorization.72 The first well-publicized
case brought under the Copyright Act was filed by fourteen Aboriginal
artists seeking compensation for the unauthorized reproduction of
Aboriginal designs on t-shirts.73 The case resulted in an injunction against
the t-shirt manufacturer and an out-of-court settlement for $150,000. 74
2. Recent Jurisprudence Has Rejected Communal Title Under the
Copyright Act, But Has Considered Aboriginal Customary Law in
Assessment of Damages
While recent jurisprudence still prevents Aboriginal groups from
asserting communal ownership or filing for damages based upon
communal harm, these cases track a gradual, legal recognition of
Aboriginal rights, even in situations where that recognition depends in
part upon a consideration of traditional and customary law. A recent
development in Australian jurisprudence represents a progression toward
greater recognition of Aboriginal rights in cultural and artistic works by
taking into account traditional Aboriginal customary law when assessing
damages for the unauthorized use of Aboriginal works.
While the Australian Copyright Act provides some protection for illicit
copying of works owned by individual authors, it recognizes neither a
remedy for the unauthorized copying of works held through communal
ownership nor compensation for communal harm.75 The Federal Court
explicitly rejected a claim of communal title in sacred images in Yumbulul v.
Reserve Bank of Australia.76 In that case, the plaintiffs, representatives of the
Galpu Clan, attempted to prevent the reproduction by the Reserve Bank of
a design created by a member of the clan.77 The Bank had issued a
commemorative banknote containing a reproduction of a design of a
Morning Star Pole done by Terry Yumbulul, who obtained his authority to
create this design only through initiation and revelatory ceremonies.
78 Of
Aboriginal peoples in their Dreamings stories, sacred images, or dances.
Blakeney, supra note 1.
72 Copyright Act, 1968, §§ 37-38 (Austl.) (providing a cause of action for both direct and
indirect infringement).
73 Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles Ltd. (1998), 157 A.L.R. 193 (AustI.) (alternatively
paginated version cited, on file with author).
74 Id.
75 Copyright Act, 1968, §§ 37-38 (Austl.); see also Blakeney, supra note 1, at 8.
76 Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia (1991), 21 I.P.R. 481 (Austl.) (alternatively
paginated version cited, on file with author).
77 Id. at 2.
78 Id. One witness in the case testified that the Morning Star Pole is at the heart of a
ceremony in which people from different clans come together to commemorate a person who
has died. During this ceremony, the Pole is presented to the family of the deceased, and is
meant to reinforce the mutual respect between clans. The witness further stated: "The
attainment of the right to make such a pole is a matter of great honour, and accordingly,
abuses of rights in relation to the careful protection of images on such poles is a subject of
great sensitivity." Testimony of Mandawuy Yunupingu, Id. at 3.
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particular significance to the court was the fact that Mr. Yumbulul had
consented to the Bank's use of the image. 79 Mr. Yumbulul had an
undisputed right to make the Morning Star Pole for ceremonial purposes,
and also for sale to places such as museums for educational purposes. 80
The plaintiffs argued that the artist had a communal obligation to the clan
to prevent the design from being used in a culturally offensive way. The
court found, however, that the pole was an original artistic work created by
Mr. Yumbulul under the terms of the Copyright Act, and that Mr.
Yumbulul assigned his rights to the Reserve Bank under a valid contractual
agreement.81 The court held that the Copyright Act did "not provide
adequate recognition of Aboriginal community claims to regulate the
reproduction and use of works which are essentially communal in
origin."
82
The next significant judicial development occurred not with regard to
Aboriginal intellectual property, but real property. In Mabo & Ors v. State of
Queensland,83 the High Court recognized, for the first time, the validity of
traditional Aboriginal land law. This holding was considered by some to be
revolutionary for its potential application to legal causes particular to
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. In the aftermath of this (literally)
landmark decision, Aboriginal advocacy groups have been demanding
legislation that will acknowledge other aspects of traditional Aboriginal
law, including the protection of traditional Aboriginal cultural resources
and art from appropriation and exploitation by others.
M. & Others,84 discussed above, was the first post-Mabo case to consider
the applicability of the Copyright Act to protecting the unauthorized
reproduction of Aboriginal designs. In that case, an Australian carpet
company had carpets manufactured in Vietnam on which were reproduced
the designs of eight Aboriginal artists. The carpet company obtained the
designs from a portfolio of artworks produced by prestigious
organizations; the works in question were bark paintings depicting
spiritually significant legends of peoples from the Central Arnhem Land, in
many instances important creation and dreaming stories strictly controlled
by Aboriginal law. The paintings were reproduced in nearly identical form
and color.85
Upon consideration of the facts, the court noted that under Aboriginal
law it was the responsibility of the traditional owners to take action to
preserve the dreaming and to punish those responsible for the breach,
punishments ranging from exclusion from ceremonies and removal of the
79 Id. at 4-9.
80 Id. at3.
81 Id. at 9.
82 Id. Following the resolution of this case, Mr. Yumbulul was criticized by the Galpu
Clan for violating his cultural obligation to ensure that the pole was not used in a manner
offensive to the sacred designs and meanings it symbolized. He later attempted to set aside
the copyright assignment on the grounds of unconscionability but was unsuccessful.
83 Mabo v. State of Queensland (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
84 M. & Others. (1994), 130 A.L.R. 659 (Austl.).
85 Id. at 662.
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privileges to reproduce clan stories to spearing.8 6 Under the Copyright Act,
damages are typically assessed according to the depreciation in value of
the copyright itself. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs in this case
would not suffer a monetary loss as a result of the defendants'
infringement, and considered itself unable to compensate for communal
harm suffered, as "the statutory remedies do not recognize the
infringement of ownership rights of the kind which reside under
Aboriginal law in the traditional owners of the dreaming stories."87 Rather,
the court awarded damages based upon a less utilized provision of the
Copyright Act allowing damages in cases of particularly egregious
infringement.
8 8
The court's holding in M. & Others moves beyond the Yumbulul
judgment and represents a progression toward greater recognition of
Aboriginal rights in cultural and artistic works, in so far as it stands for the
proposition that courts may take traditional Aboriginal customary law into
account when assessing damages for the unauthorized use of Aboriginal
works. However, the court's holdings in both M. & Others and Yumbulul
still prevent Aboriginal groups from asserting communal ownership or
filing for damages based upon communal harm.
3. A Recent Decision Applies Fiduciary Principles to the Issue of
Communal Ownership of Aboriginal Works
The court tackled the question of whether the communal interests of
Aboriginal owners in cultural works recognized under traditional law
created binding obligations on third persons outside the Aboriginal
community under the 1968 Copyright Act in its most recent case on point:
Bulun Bulun & Anor v. R & T Textiles Ltd.89 In that case, a Ganalbingu artist
filed suit alleging infringement of the copyright in his work "Magpie Geese
and Water Lilies at the Waterhole," 90 which designs had appeared on
printed clothing fabric in Australia. Joining him in the suit was a
representative of the Ganalbingu people, who claimed that the Ganalbingu
people were equitable owners of the copyright in the painting. The court
reasoned that the Ganalbingu people could only have equitable rights in
the painting if there had been a trust placed upon expressions of ritual
knowledge. The court analogized to African tribal communities in which
indigenous property was regarded as being held in trust by the head of the
86 Id. at 663.
87 Id.
88 Id. The court invoked Williams v. Settle, 1 W.L.R. 1072, 1986-87 (1960), which upheld an
award of substantial damages for the sale of wedding photographs of a plaintiff whose father
had been murdered in well-known circumstances, where a strictly commercial assessment
would have resulted in a minimal level of loss.
89 Bulun Bulun & Anor v. R & T Textiles Ltd, 157 A.L.R. 193 (1998) (alternatively
paginated version cited, on file with author).
90 Id. The painting depicted the main totemic well for the artist's clan of the Ganalbingu
people, called Djulibinyamurr, and has been described as being the place from which the
turtle creator of the Ganalbingu emerged. See also Blakeney, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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tribal group. The court found that in this case there was no trust
established, because there was neither a manifestation of intent nor a
practice on the part of the Ganalbingu people to hold artworks in trust.91
The significance of this case lies, however, in its application of
fiduciary principles to the issues at hand. The court found that Mr. Bulun
Bulun had a fiduciary duty "not to exploit the artistic work in such a way
that is contrary to the laws and custom of the Ganalbingu people, and, in
the event of infringement by a third party, to take reasonable and
appropriate action to restrain and remedy infringement of the copyright in
the artistic work."92 As Mr. Bulun Bulun had enforced his copyright, the
court dismissed the action brought by the Ganalbingu representative,
holding that the rights of the Ganalbingu people were confined to a right in
personam against the artist to enforce his copyright against third party
infringers.9
3
This principle is one that has been used in other countries'
jurisprudence regarding indigenous peoples, 94 but this was a case of first
impression with respect to the application of fiduciary principles to
indigenous issues in Australia. While the court still failed to recognize
equitable communal interest in the copyright itself, it did acknowledge that
indigenous peoples could be collective beneficiaries of fiduciary
obligations owed to them by a copyright holder.95
D. Other Possibilities for Expanding the Notion of Authorship Are
Inherent in Existing Tenets of Copyright Law
1. Joint Authorship, Transfers of Rights, and Works Made for Hire
Provide for the Maintenance of Some Collective Rights
The most logical possibility for attributing group copyrights to
indigenous peoples may rest in the notion of joint authorship. However, as
currently conceived, joint authorship has a high threshold that may be
difficult, if not impossible, for indigenous peoples to meet. Joint authorship
allows multiple authors of a work to be co-owners of the copyright in that
work, provided that: (1) the joint authors collaborate in fact in the work's
91 Bulun Bulun, at 3-4.
92 See id. at 17-20.
93 Id.
94 Canada, in particular. See Blakeney, supra note 1.
95 The court was careful to couch its holding in terms of factual analysis:
The conclusion that in all the circumstances Mr. Bulun Bulun owes
fiduciary obligations to the Ganalbingu people does not treat the law and
custom of the Ganalbingu people as part of the Australian legal system.
Rather, it treats the law and custom of the Ganalbingu people as part of
the factual matrix which characterizes the relationship as one of mutual
trust and confidence. It is that relationship which the Australian legal
system recognizes as giving rise to the fiduciary relationship, and to the
obligations which arise out of it.
Bulun Bulun, at 19.
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preparation; (2) the authors intend, at the time the work is prepared, that
their contributions be merged into "inseparable or interdependent parts of
a unitary whole;" and (3) each person's contribution is itself
copyrightable. 96 Under the principles of joint authorship, then, only those
members of the indigenous community who were involved in the creation
of a work can be joint authors, and the rest of the community could not be
considered rights-holders.
Two other possible areas of existing copyright law within which
indigenous people may find sources of collective authorship are found in
the provisions for transfers of rights and works made for hire. Transfers of
rights occur when an individual artist transfers his or her rights to the
community as a corporate entity.97 To circumvent the possibility of an artist
refusing to transfer those rights, the work could be done as a work made
for hire. Under United States copyright law, for example, a work made for
hire is "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment." 98 Under this provision, corporate entities can claim
authorship rights to a given work when that work is created as part of an
individual's job.99 However, there may be ethical reasons why indigenous
peoples would not want to avail themselves of this provision, either
because they do not want to be seen as a corporate entity or because they
do not want to characterize the relationship of the community with its
members as one of employment.
2. United States Courts Have Upheld the Legal Definition of Cultural
Patrimony, Which Includes the Concept of Collective Control
and/or Ownership
Another legal possibility from which indigenous peoples could benefit
is the concept of cultural patrimony. In fact, the Tenth Circuit has upheld a
legal definition of cultural patrimony with reference to indigenous peoples
in the United States. In United States v. Corrow,l00 a defendant convicted of
trafficking in cultural patrimony under the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act1°' (NAGPRA) asserted that the definition
of cultural patrimony contained therein was void for vagueness "in its
multitude of meanings . . . creating easy prey for the untrammeled
discretion of law enforcement." 10 2 Under NAGPRA, cultural patrimony is
96 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) ("The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the
work."); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (A joint work is "a work prepared by two or more authors with
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole").
97 See generally 17 U.S.C. Ch. 2 (2000); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Circular 9,
www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf.
98 See generally 17 U.S.C. Ch. 2 (2000).
99 Id.
100 United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997).
101 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, § 2(D),
104 Stat. 3048 (1990).
102 Corrow, 119 F.3d at 799.
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defined as:
an object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural
importance central to Native American group or culture
itself, rather than property owned by an individual Native
American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated,
appropriated, or conveyed by any individual regardless of
whether or not the individual is a member of the Indian
tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and such object
shall have been considered inalienable by such Native
American group at the time the object was separated from
such group 10
3
In Corrow, the defendant had been convicted of transporting Yei B'Chei
ceremonial adornments. While Indian authorities did not agree as to
whether the adornments were owned by the tribe or by the individual, the
Tenth Circuit nonetheless rejected the defendant's argument, stating that
"NAGPRA's reach in [protecting sacred cultural items] warrants its
aspirational characterization as 'human rights legislation."' 1 4 If this
concept of cultural patrimony can be applied to copyright doctrine and
practice, it could also be an effective vehicle to grant rights regarding the
cultural artistic and literary works of indigenous peoples in the United
States, and as a model for international legislation codifying collective
ownership.
V. ORIGINALITY REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT EXPANDED
NOTIONS OF AUTHORSHIP, DEFINING ORIGINALITY IN TERMS OF A COMMUNITY
RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL
In many copyright systems, including Australia, Canada, and the
United States, a work must be original to be eligible for protection. In fact,
the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced in a recent case that "[tjhe sine qua non
of copyright is originality." 10 5 Originality requires that the work be the
product of original thought, skill, or labor of the author. The threshold is
not a high one; a work satisfies the requirement by evidencing original skill
and labor of its creator. Where a work is based upon a preexisting work,
for example, it must demonstrate substantial variation.
10 6
Some authors argue that this requirement presents problems for the
protection of culturally significant artistic and literary works of indigenous
peoples, because those works are often by their very nature not innovative,
but rather derived from preexisting works in a "slow process of creative
development." 107 Farley, for example, recognizes indigenous art's function
as a historical and sacred text, and notes that as such, innovation is
103 Id.
104 Corrow, 119 F.3d at 800.
105 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
106 Farley, supra note 4, at 19.
107 Id. at 21.
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restricted and faithful and accurate reproduction is important.108 While
those propositions are certainly accurate, I do not believe that they
contraindicate compliance with copyright laws; rather, if we expand the
notion of authorship itself, then by extension we are no longer relying
upon the originality of one singular creator, but that of a community. If the
work is originally produced by the community itself-that is, the
communal authors of the work-then it should satisfy the litmus test of
originality for copyright purposes.
VI. THE DURATION OF COPYRIGHT BASED ON "LIFE OF THE AUTHOR" IN MANY
JURISDICTIONS MUST ADEQUATELY PROTECT CULTURAL WORKS OF
COMMUNAL AUTHORSHIP
International treaties such as the Berne Convention establish limits for
the duration of copyright protection, basing such terms typically on the
"life of the author." 10 9 The Berne Convention provides: "The term of
protection granted by this Convention shall be the life of the author and
fifty years after his death."110 Domestic laws, such as Article 1, Section 8 of
the United States Constitution, also limit the term of intellectual property
protection."'
These limitations may be practically inapplicable where a literary or
artistic work is the work of an indigenous community, and inapposite on a
public policy basis where these works need extended protection to support
private creative contributions of "usually unknown members of a number
of subsequent generations of a community.""
2
Some authors theorize that perpetual protection of cultural works is
incompatible with the basic tenets of intellectual property laws. However,
one does not have to look very far to see possible models for legal
development within the context of current intellectual property regimes. In
the United States, for example, trademarks remain protected as long as
they are in use.113 As Moran argues, "[T]o extend this type of protection to
folklife expressions so that they are protected as long as they remain in use
in a customary, traditional, or sacred context within the folk community
which created them, is incompatible neither with American law in general
nor with the current range of intellectual property interests which we
108 Id.
109 Berne Convention, supra note 35, art. 7; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR No.
1 (2000), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circl.html#hlc (providing copyright protection for
the life of the author plus an additional 70, 95, or 120 year term); and 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305
(2000).
110 Berne Convention, supra note 35, art. 7 (providing that member states can elect to
extend this term of protection).
111 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to grant authors and inventors
"exclusive Right" to their work "for limited Times").
112 WIPO REGIONAL MEETING OF HEADS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICES OF
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, WIPO/IPH/POS/97/1(b) (July 16, 1997), at 3.
113 Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-1059 (1997).
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protect."114
A. The Concept of "Derivative Works" May Inform These Debates
Over Duration of Protection for Cultural Works
Alternatively, Moran posits, it is possible to view relevant cultural
works as "derivative work" under U.S. copyright law following the end of
the initial time limit for protection.115 A derivative work under copyright
law is a work that is based on (or derived from) one or more already
existing works, and is copyrightable provided that it includes an "original
work of authorship." 116 Derivative works can include, inter alia,
translations, musical arrangements, dramatizations, fictionalizations, art
reproductions, and condensations. Any work in which the modifications
represent, as a whole, an original work of authorship is a "derivative
work"; usually derivative works are primarily new works that incorporate
previously published material. 17
Under this scheme, it is possible that new generations of indigenous
communities - the "several subsequent generations of a folk
community"118 proposed by Moran -can be viewed as the "new" author of
the derivative cultural work. Incorporating cultural works into the
discourse of derivations may be a step toward ensuring lasting protection
for vital, cultural works.
One significant problem, however, is that to be copyrightable, a
derivative work must be different enough from the original to be regarded
as a "new work" or must contain a substantial amount of new material.
Making minor changes or additions of little substance to a preexisting
work will not qualify the work as a new version for copyright purposes.119
The new material must in itself be original and copyrightable. 120 Therefore,
for important cultural works to fall into the realm of derivative works,
those works will have to evolve significantly from their original form.
While such modification may happen in some instances, it is unlikely that
the work will be sufficiently "new" for copyright purposes. In any event,
derivative works provide a precedent for extending the duration of
protection for copyrighted works and present a starting point for
discussions on extending copyright protection for valuable cultural works
of ongoing vitality.
B. Public Policy Concerns over Works in the Public Domain and the
114 Moran, supra note 30, at 115.
115 Id.
116 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 14,
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ4.htm [hereinafter CIRCULAR 14].
117 Id.
118 Moran, supra note 30, at 115.
119 See CIRCULAR 14, supra note 116.
120 See id.
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Encouragement of Future Creation Must Be Considered in Policy
Formation.
Efforts to increase the duration of protection for cultural works must be
balanced with public domain interests as well. Wholesale protection of all
of the cultural elements of a given community could not only have a severe
effect on the scope of works available from the public domain, but could do
serious harm to the creation of future works.121 As Long advocates,
"[s]elective use of protection of cultural works that might otherwise be
considered part of the public domain, creating a limited domaine public
payant,122 should reduce harmful derivation costs by removing only those
elements of the nation's culture from unfettered use which the nation itself
believes to be either more vulnerable to de-culturization or more valuable
to the maintenance of the country's cultural heritage." 123
VI. IN ANY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SCHEME PROTECTING INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES' ARTISTIC AND LITERARY WORKS, SPECIAL PROTECTION MUST BE
ACCORDED SACRED CULTURAL WORKS
One of the most difficult issues regarding the protection of cultural
works of indigenous peoples arises in the context of sacred works. I
highlighted some of these issues in the context of the developing body of
Aboriginal Australian case law discussed above. Interestingly, these issues
have arisen not only in the substantive law but also in the context of civil
procedure. For example, in the copyright case M. & Others, respect for
Aboriginal custom regarding sacred names led the judge to modify court
procedure. 24 In that case, the names of five deceased artists whose works
were being infringed upon were never spoken during the course of the
trial, in accordance with Aboriginal customs concerning proper respect for
the artists' spirits."25
It is possible to couple copyright law with other rights in order to
adequately protect sacred works. Moral rights, trade secret law, and unfair
121 Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An
Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229,270 (1998).
122 A domaine public payant is literally a "paying public domain" and is generally
understood as a legislative scheme that imposes a fee for the use of works in the public
domain when an author cannot be identified. Funds raised as part of this scheme usually go to
support arts organizations, and could, in these instances, be directed toward arts or cultural
organizations supporting indigenous communities. The idea of using a system of domaine
public payant to protect copyright issues has been explored by WIPO and UNESCO in the past.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources: A
Challenge to the International Intellectual Property System, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE INTERNET, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE, www.wipo.org/ip-conf-bg/en/documents/pdf/sof0l_3_1l.pdf (organized by
WIPO and the National Intellectual Property Association of Bulgaria, Sofia, Bulgaria, May 29-
31, 2001).
123 Long, supra note 121, at 270.
124 Moran, supra note 30, at 110.
125 Id.
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competition law provide three sources from which to draw upon for the
protection of sacred works.
A. Moral Rights are Granted to the Author of a Work and Protect the
Integrity of that Work
Moral rights prohibit the alteration of a work without the author's
permission.126 Moral rights include the rights of divulgation, paternity, and
integrity. They also allow artists to protect their work from alteration or
denigration.127 As such, moral rights may be used to preserve the cultural
integrity of indigenous works. Formal support for the incorporation of
moral rights into domestic intellectual property law is found in the Berne
Convention:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even
after the transfer of said rights, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.128
Problems in the application of moral rights to this area include, like
copyright, authorship and duration of rights. Like copyright laws, moral
rights are founded in Romantic notions of granting authorship rights to
individual authors or creators. Where a work has no identifiable creator,
however, as suggested with regard to copyright law, it is possible that a
designated body could serve as the recipient of moral rights in that work.
Secondly, moral rights usually endure only until the death of the author or
after a set time period. An indigenous community may want to protect the
integrity of a work beyond a limited time, as the community's interest in
the work may endure beyond that finite point.
Notably, moral rights have had some success in Europe, but less
success in the United States, where they have been incorporated into the
Visual Artists' Rights Act.129 European Community law recognizes an
author's personal and property rights in a given work, extended into the
international community through the Berne Convention.130 In France, the
126 See Mike Holderness, Moral Rights and Author's Rights: The Keys to The Information Age,
J. INFo. L. & TECH. 1998(1) (Feb. 27,1998),
at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/infosoc/981hold/holder.htm.
127 Id.
128 Berne Convention, supra note 35, art. 6bis.
129 Visual Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). For a brief summary, see Richard DahIson,
Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990 and Droit Moral,
at http://www.jw.com/industries/EntertainSports/Visual _ArtistsRights Act.htm.
130 In response to the Green Paper on Copyright, the National Union of Journalists
commented:
[T]he integrity and authenticity of an artist's work is of importance to
society as a whole. The enduring value of a piece of writing or a
photograph or a design may not be immediately recognized. Unless
moral rights are preserved there is a danger that the original work will be
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droit moral exists in conjunction with property rights. In Germany, an
author's personal rights exist in exclusion to all others. Bernard Tavernier,
a French filmmaker, insists that his films be shown without commercial
breaks, something that his droit moral permits him to do. 31 Theoretically, if
Tavernier were to distribute his works in jurisdictions that did not honor
the moral rights of the creator, arbitrary changes to those works could be
made.
Since moral rights are economic only in so far as authors or creators are
unwilling for their works to be distributed in markets without them, or to
the extent that readers and viewers refuse to accept information without
this guarantee of personal authenticity, they have not taken hold as an
effective means of intellectual property protection in the United States. As
essentially a non-economic right, moral rights have not enjoyed the benefit
of enforcement as much as other intellectual property mechanisms within
the United States legal system. While moral rights have not enjoyed much
success in U.S. jurisprudence, however, they still may be an excellent
vehicle for indigenous peoples, in efforts to protect sacred works from
alteration by others internationally, in contexts within which economic
rights are less important than the integrity of the work itself.
B. Trade Secrets Can Serve as an Additional Mechanism to Protect
Indigenous Sacred Works
In narrow situations where a given cultural work is sacred; where that
sacred work was only revealed to a few initiated members of a particular
community; and where the community can argue that the work was
acquired through improper means, indigenous peoples may effectively use
trade secret law to protect certain culturally significant, sacred works. To
prove misappropriation of a trade secret, an indigenous group must prove
that: (1) the work constitutes a trade secret; and (2) that it was acquired
through improper means.132 In order for a work to constitute a trade secret,
it must be (a) a secret and (b) have economic value.133 Where a community
has taken reasonable measures to protect the information from the general
public, it will likely be considered to be secret. 134 It may be more difficult
modified to make it commercially "successful." Very quickly the vigour
and variety of our culture will degenerate into what is merely easy to sell
... [Secondly t]he constant use and re-use of editorial material, altered,
modified, or distorted to suit every conceivable niche in the market, is not
a happy prospect. The citizen/consumer in our 'information society'
must be able to trust-to rely on-the authenticity of the images and
information which are being provided. That trust cannot be located in an
anonymous corporation-whether it be the BBC or News International-
but in the moral and ethical standards of journalists themselves.
Quoted in Holderness, supra note 126.
131 Id. (citing personal communication with Director John Crone, 1997).
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for the indigenous group to demonstrate economic value. It may also be
difficult for the community to demonstrate that the work was acquired
through improper means, which requires a showing that the exploiter
knew or should have known that the work was improperly acquired. 35 In
the Aboriginal cases discussed above, for example, the defendants all
acquired the works overtly and easily; however, an argument can certainly
be made by the indigenous communities in this context that the venues
within which the works could be found, and the manner in which they
were displayed, contributes to a showing of bad faith.
C. Trademark Law Based on Unfair Competition May Provide a
Third Vehicle for the Protection of Sacred Works of Indigenous
Peoples
Indigenous peoples may use trademark law to protect against false
representations or descriptions related to marketed goods and services.
The Lanham Act of the United States, codified in Title 15 of the United
States Code, for example, prohibits the unauthorized use in interstate
commerce of any "false or misleading description . . . which is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 13 6 Unfair competition
laws are based on principles of consumer protection and designed to
protect both consumers and competitors from the misrepresentation of
products in the marketplace.
The Lanham Act is a trademark law that creates a cause of action for
individuals or groups. Section 2(a) of the Act effectively precludes the
registration of disparaging marks:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its
nature unless it: (a) Consists of or comprises immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons,
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or
bring them into contempt, or disrepute.
137
The Patent and Trademark Board has found marks unregisterable
based on association with particular goods and services, or independently,
based exclusively on the mark itself. In some cases, courts have noted the
group nature of section 2(a) protection. For example, section 2(a) has been
used with some success by Native Americans to challenge the trademark
registration of symbols considered to be disparaging to the Native
American community.13 In a 1999 case, Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc.,139 the
135 Id. at §1(2)(i).
136 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
137 Id. at § 1052(a).
138 For an interesting discussion of recent case law, see Bruce C. Kelber, "Scalping the
Redskins": Can Trademark Law Start Athletic Teams Bearing Native American Nicknames and Images
on the Road to Racial Reform?, 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 533 (1994).
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board canceled the registration of six
Washington Redskins trademarks in response to a challenge by Native
American activists who contended that the word "Redskin" was
disparaging under Section 2(a).140
Trademark law has the advantages of granting collective rights and of
providing perpetual protection. However, in order to fall within the
umbrella of this form of intellectual property protection, artistic and
literary works of indigenous peoples must generally constitute commercial
goods or services. Indigenous peoples could therefore prevent the
marketing of outside goods as "Aboriginal made" or "Indian made," for
example, but could not protect sacred works such as dance, ritual
ceremonies, or even sacred texts, not used in interstate commerce.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many authors who argue for a sui generis system for the protection of
Traditional Knowledge posit that intellectual property law is an inadequate
forum within which to seek such protection because traditional intellectual
property law is based on a culturally specific paradigm. The establishment
of one international system, or much more likely, multiple national sui
generis systems, however, would deprive those seeking protection of
valuable traditional knowledge and cultural properties of the benefit of the
existing body of law, existing mindshare, and cache inherent in the current
intellectual property legal regime.
If a particular legal system is found to be inadequate in light of
globalization and widespread internationalization of legal regimes, it must
expand to accommodate various cultures and interests falling within its
gambit. If existing intellectual property laws are found to inadequately
ensure the protection of valuable works, inventions, designs, or
knowledge, then that system needs to adapt to ensure protection that is
both effective and meaningful to the cultures it represents. This
reconfiguration would involve an expansion of "properties" to reflect a
multicultural concept of ownership. Within the realm of artistic and
literary works of indigenous peoples, reconfiguration might lead
toincorporation of collective ownership, expansion of originality
requirements, and application of limits on the duration of protection in a
139 Harjo v. Pro Football Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
140 Other interesting applications of Section 2(a) to moral issues and group rights include
Bromberg v. Carmel Self Service Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978), in which two women
successfully petitioned the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel the registration of a
restaurant slogan, "Only a Breast in the Mouth is Better than a Leg in the Hand", as being
disparaging to women. Another interesting case is Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (1999),
where the U.S. Court of Appeals held that a citizen who believed that O.J. Simpson's name
was synonymous with murder and spousal abuse had standing to bring a Sec. 2(a) opposition
to Mr. Simpson's proposed registration of his name and nicknames, doing away with earlier
requirements that a mark be offensive to a large community and that the opposer have a
special interest in the matter.
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broader community context. Intellectual property laws must also
accommodate the protection of sacred cultural works.
In sum, it is crucial that we insist upon the adaptation and expansion
of specific legal requirements to adequately reflect modem needs
concerning the protection of Traditional Knowledge of all peoples,
including indigenous peoples. To create sui generis systems to protect the
same subject matter for different actors is merely a misapplication of logic.
A. Intellectual Property Law is a Dynamic Body of Law That Has a
History of Adapting to Evolving Conceptions of Works and Their
Protectorate
Intellectual property doctrine has a history of adapting to tensions that
have been present in its law for a long time and that have gone
unrecognized. The adaptations result in new constructs previously thought
antithetical to existing intellectual property law. In the United States,
trademark dilution is one example. Design patents are another.
Before trademark dilution was an accepted part of trademark law, the
sine qua non of trademark infringement was the likelihood of confusion.
Because trademark law is based on consumer protection law, it was
thought that if there was no possibility for the consumer to become
confused as to the source of the product, there was no trademark
infringement. Theorists began to argue that the value of a trademark was
not simply in its source signification function, but also on its "uniqueness
and singularity," 141 and that a mark could be infringed by "the gradual
whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public
mind."14' Over time, as the debate gained momentum, trademark law as it
was known was overhauled, first in a series of state laws on the issue and
gradually working up to the federal law governing trademarks, the
Lanham Act.143 Even though a theory of trademark infringement based
upon dilution was entirely antithetical to existing trademark law, when it
came time to recognize dilution as a cause of action, the law adapted its
criteria to accommodate that new aspect of trademark law -even though
that aspect directly contradicted the foundations of the old one.
Design patents provide a further example of the historical evolution of
intellectual property law to conform to changing conceptions of protectable
properties. Traditionally, patent law protected exclusively functional
inventions.'" When industrial designs became seen as part of the body of
141 Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARVARD L. REV. 813,
831 (1927).
142 Id. at 825.
143 H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030
("[Aipproximately twenty-five states have laws that prohibit trademark dilution."); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c) (2000).
144 For an overview of patent history and development in the United States, see Ladas &
Perry, A Brief History of the Patent Law of the United States,
http://www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html.
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intangible properties worthy of protection, federal patent law was
amended to cover, remarkably, inventions that were not functional.145 In
fact, if a design is functional- that is, capable of being protected by a utility
patent- it is not eligible for a design patent.
B. Theorists and Practitioners Must Advocate Conforming the Law to
the Needs of a Global Community
Intellectual property laws have been, and continue to be, the most
globally accepted system for protecting artistic, literary, and scientific
works from exploitation and promoting the creation of those works
through the provision of rights. In light of increasing globalization and
commodification of content, intellectual property laws are being applied in
new ways to new sectors of society. In the process of that application, if
specific laws, or assumptions upon which those laws are based, are found
to be inadequate, they must change accordingly. Extricating cultural and
economic bias from specific legislation is not new, and both theory and
practice must step up to that challenge in the intellectual property arena as
any other.
145 See id.
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